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ly	 by	 the	 goodness	 of	 the	 outcomes	 of	 her	 actions.	 Following	one	
standard	philosophical	convention,	we	will	call	this	stronger	thesis	
consequentialism.2
It	 seems	quite	 clear	 that	bringing	 about	 good	outcomes	 is	 one	
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along	 these	 lines,	 see	Portmore	 2011	 (although	Portmore	does	not	 put	his	
favored	 version	 of	 TCR	 or	 consequentialism	 in	 terms	 of	 reasons	 to	 bring	
about	good	outcomes,	 it	will	become	clear	 from	our	account	of	evaluative	
things	does	not	withstand	reflective	scrutiny.3	Many	such	arguments	
begin	 by	 observing	 that	 it	 is	 overwhelmingly	 plausible	 that	 there	
are	moral	reasons	to	do	what	is	good	for	others	and	to	avoid	doing	
what	 is	bad	 for	 them.	These	arguments	 concede	 that	 it	 is	 initially	
plausible	that	there	are	moral	reasons	to	do	other	things,	like	keep	
our	promises	and	respect	 the	autonomy	of	others,	even	when	this	
















not	 from	 the	 failure	 of	 non-consequentialist	 considerations	 to	with-
stand	scrutiny,	but	from	general	reflections	on	the	nature	of	morality	
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inquiry	—	plausible	 in	 the	abstract	 that	 inflicting	harm	 is	 intrinsically	
worse	than	failing	to	provide	aid	and	that	setting	out	to	harm	someone	
is	intrinsically	worse	than	harming	her	as	a	foreseen	consequence	of	










proponents	 of	 constraints	 provide	 an	 independent	 justification	 for	
why	we	should	accept	them	beyond	their	direct	plausibility	even if	this	
plausibility	 withstands	 the	 careful	 clarification	 of	 their	 content	 and	







/	allowing	distinction	 for	decision	making	under	 risk	 (87–91);	 the	possibil-
ity	 that	 the	ways	we	draw	the	distinctions	are	gerrymandered	 functions	of,	
and	 thus	cannot	 justify,	our	 intuitions	about	particular	cases	 (101–106	and	
138–144);	and	the	particular	difficulty	of	constructing	a	plausible	story	about	
the	moral	status	of	interrupting	aid	in	progress	(106–111).
9.	 Beyond,	of	 course,	 simply	providing	some	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	no	 factors	
other	 than	promoting	 the	 good	 are	 genuinely	 relevant	because	 their	 appar-
ent	relevance	cannot	survive	critical	scrutiny.	But	this	does	not	support	the	
asymmetric	requirement	that	we	must	provide	independent	justifications	of	
In	 this	paper	we	argue	 that	closer	attention	 to	why	 there	are	 rea-
sons	to	promote	good	outcomes	shows	the	top-down	strategy	to	be	
unsound.	We	argue	that	there	are	reasons	to	promote	good	states	be-












We	believe	 that	 the	unsoundness	of	 the	 top-down	strategy	 is	 im-
portant,	not	only	because	explicit	uses	of	 the	strategy	have	been	 in-
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moral	 reasons	 against	 any	 acts	 save	 those	 that	 fail	 to	minimize	 the	
extent	 to	which	undesirable	 things	happen	 in	 the	world.	 (The	kind	
of	concern	that	Nozick	and	Scheffler	are	expressing	is	sometimes	re-


























ous	between	 (i)	our	having	 intuitions	about	 cases	 that	would	be	 captured	
by	the	distinction,	and	(ii)	its	being	plausible	in	the	abstract	that	there	is	an	
intrinsic	moral	 distinction	of	 this	 kind.	But	 context	 suggests	 that	Norcross	
intends	ii	(perhaps	in	addition	to	i);	for	instance,	he	concedes	the	plausibility	
of	a	claim	the content of which	asserts	the	relative	priority	of	the	rights,	namely,	
“My	right	not	to	be	poisoned	does	seem	stronger	than	my	right,	if	any,	to	be	
given	the	food	I	need	to	survive”	(457).	
What	makes	Kagan’s	 inability	 to	 find	 successful	 plausibility-inde-
pendent	arguments	in	favor	of	non-consequentialist	constraints	look	














surrounding	 the	 claim	 that	 some	acts	are	 so	objectionable	 that	one	
ought	not	to	perform	them	even	if	this	means	that	more	equally	weighty	
acts	of	the	very	same	kind	or	other	comparably	objectionable	events	
ensue”	 (82)	 clearly	 seems	 to	presuppose	 the	 incomprehensibility	 of	
non-consequentialist	constraints	even if their plausibility withstood scrutiny	but	
no	similar	independent	justifications	of	moral	reasons	to	promote	the	good.	
Kagan	 is	 right	 that	 his	 stated	 aim	 of	 engaging	with	 non-consequentialists	
whom	he	sees	as	already	committed	to	moral	reasons	to	promote	the	good	
relieves	 him	 of	 the	 need	 to	 provide	 an	 independent	 justification	 of	 these	
reasons	 (17–19).	 But	 he	 is	wrong	 to	 think	 that	 the	 ad	 hominem	nature	 of	
his	arguments	entitles	him	to	use	the	inability	of	his	opponents	to	provide	
plausibility-independent	 justifications	 of	 non-consequentialist	 constraints	






























being	wrong)	 can be analyzed as	 its	 being	fitting	 to	have	particular	mo-
tivationally	 laden	attitudes	towards	 it	 (like	desires	 that	S	or	 feelings	of	
obligation	not	to	perform	A),	and	
(2*)	What it is for there to be	 reason	to	perform	an	act	(e. g.	 to	promote	S	or	
avoid	performing	A)	is	for	the	act	to	constitute	or	achieve	something	that	
it	is	fitting	to	be	motivated	to	do	or	achieve.
	 We	believe	 that	much	of	 our	 argument	would	 remain	 sound	 if	 alternative	








readers	 for	Philosophers’ Imprint	 for	pointing	out	and	encouraging	us	 to	dis-
cuss	ways	in	which	our	main	argument	most	centrally	depends	on	(1)	and	(2),	
and	can	remain	sound	even	if	(1*)	and	(2*)	are	mistaken.
is	 either	 incoherent	or	devoid	of	 the	 theoretically	 independent	 con-
nection	to	practical	reasons	presupposed	by	the	top-down	strategy.11 
Against	 these	 authors	we	 show	how	consequentialists’	 talk	of	 good	
states	is	 intelligible,	and	how	there	is	 indeed	a	deep	theoretical	con-
nection	between	 good	 states	 and	 reasons	 to	 act.	 But	we	 argue	 that,	
unfortunately	 for	 the	 top-down	strategy,	once	one	understands	why 
this	connection	holds,	it	becomes	equally	clear	how	there	can	be	rea-













in	section	5	 that	an	act’s	moral	status	consists	 in	 the	fittingness	of	a	
particular	kind	of	act-directed	motive,	namely	a	feeling	of	obligation	to	
perform	or	avoid	performing	it.	This	means	that	the	same	connection	
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In	contrast	 to	pragmatic	reasons,	considerations	 like	the	fact	 that	





concept	 reasons	 for	 desire	 should	 thus	 be	 in	 terms	 of	 fittingness,	
rather	than	pragmatic,	reasons.15	Of	course,	if	the	concept	of	a	fitting-
ness	reason	to	desire	a	state	just	was	that	of	a	consideration	that	bears	
on	whether	 the	state	 is	good,	 this	sort	of	analysis	would	be	circular.	
We	think,	however,	that	the	distinction	between	judgments	about	fit-
tingness	as	opposed	to	pragmatic	reasons	for	attitudes	can	be	made	
sense	of	without	 invoking	ethical	 concepts	 like	goodness.16	While	a	
full	account	of	 the	distinction	 is	beyond	the	scope	of	 this	paper,	we	
think	it	can	be	usefully	characterized	by	noting	that	it	is	characteristic	







Judgments	about	 the	existence	of	fittingness	 reasons	 for	an	attitude,	
however,	do	seem	capable	of	directly	guiding	us	into	having	it	without	
having	to	first	motivate	us	to	do	anything	to	get	ourselves	to	have	it.	



























clarification	and	 refinement	 concerning	both	 the	kind of reasons	 and	
the	kind of desires	it	involves.	Beginning	with	the	first	issue,	there	are	





















Judgments	 that	a	state	 is	good	thus	seem	to	be	 judgments	 that	a	
desire	for	the	state	is	supported	by	the	fittingness	reasons	one	shares	
with	the	group	one	means	to	be	talking	or	thinking	together	with.	In	
thinking	 about	what	 she	 should	want,	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 the	 judge’s	
group	 to	 shrink	 to	herself	 alone.	 It	 is	 also	possible	 for	 the	 judge	 to	
address	or	think	on	behalf	of	the	widest	group	of	agents	with	whom	
she	 shares	fittingness	 reasons	 to	desire	 states.	We	 think	 that	 this	 is	
















19.	 This	 contextualist	 account	 thus	 provides	 a	 solution	 to	 “the	 Partiality	Chal-
lenge”	as	to	how	we	can	analyze	judgments	about	good	states	as	judgments	









If	we	are	 to	analyze	 judgments	 about	 a	 state’s	 goodness	as	 judg-
ments	 that	 there	 are	 sufficient	fittingness	 reasons	 to	desire	 it,	 there	
remains	a	question	as	to	whose	reasons	these	are	supposed	to	be.	For	
instance,	 if	 both	 Jones’s	 child	 and	Smith’s	 child	 are	dying	of	 kidney	
failure,	and	there	is	only	one	kidney	available	for	transplant,	it	seems	
fitting	for	 Jones	to	desire	 the	state	of	 its	being	transplanted	 into	her	
child,	but	fitting	for	Smith	to	desire	an	alternative	state	of	the	kidney	
being	transplanted	into	her	child.













seems	to	mean	that	the fittingness reasons they share	support,	on	balance,	
17.	 In	certain	contexts,	such	as	those	of	giving	advice,	one	might	call	states	good	



























































viduals	 to	greater	gains	 for	other	 individuals	 in	 the	name	of	equality	(Tem-
kin	2003),	priority	(Parfit	1997),	or	sufficiency	(Crisp	2006);	and	whether	we	

























XA	 is	 something	 like	 “A’s	 perspective.”.	While	we	 think	 that	our	basic	 argu-
ment	 could	be	made	using	 this	 alternative	 contextualist	 account,	 it	would	
have	to	take	as	basic	and	unanalyzed	the	idea	of	“goodness	relative	to	agent	
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plays	 the	 role	 of	 combining	 with	 representations	 that	
<φ-ing	is	(or	is	not)	part	of	a	way	of	doing	A>26 to	explain	
φ-ing,27	while




























which	 explain	 different	 aspects	 of	 cognition	 and	 behavior.	 A	 state-




















24.	Of	 course,	 under	happier	 circumstances,	 the	meek	person’s	motivation	 to	
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Fitting Attitude Analysis of Good States:	To	judge	that	
state	of	 affairs S is	 good	 is	 to	 judge	 that	 the	fittingness	
reasons	 one	 shares	with	 a	 contextually	 specified	 set	 of	




have	 and	 be	 largely	 a	matter	 of	 degree	 (150–155).	We	believe	 that	 similar	
arguments	can	be	made	to	support	attributions	of	representations	of	the	rel-













































ticated	to	be	necessary	 for	an	 individual	 to	have	act-directed	motives	(and	














meta-cognitive	 reflection	or	access	 to	our	 thoughts	about	constitution	and	
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if	 someone	were	 to	 label	 as	 “good”	 precisely	 those	 states	we	 think	













there are	 fittingness	 reasons	 that	 on	 balance	 favor	 our	 having	 a	 pro-






with	 descriptive	 facts	 about	what	will	 achieve	 these	 aims),	 and	 the	
30.	One	might,	for	instance,	think	that	judgments	about	what’s	good	involve	cer-
tain	substantive	platitudes	or	normative	presuppositions	about	the	sorts	of	





























all	 those	 states	we	 call	 good,	 but	 took	 this	 to	 have	no	 significance	
for	what	 it	was	appropriate	 to	desire	and	consequently	had	no	pro-













29.	Other	plausible	examples	of	 this	general	propensity	of	 judgments	 that	atti-
tudes	are	fitting	include	the	abilities	of	judgments	that	beliefs	are	warranted	
by	our	evidence,	that	it	is	appropriate	to	be	angry	at	someone,	and	that	we	
should	 (in	 a	 non-pragmatic	 sense)	 intend	 to	 do	 certain	 things	 to	 directly	
generate	 those	beliefs,	 feelings	of	anger,	and	 intentions	(see	Gibbard	1990,	
36–76;	and	Scanlon	1998,	18–22).	
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Warrant Composition Principle [WCP]:	Let	P	be	a	psychic	











have	 the	pro-attitude,	 a	 consideration	 cannot	make	 the	pro-attitude	
fitting	without	making	the	motivation	fitting	as	well.
The	 second	part	of	 this	 connection	between	fitting	attitudes	and	
reasons	to	act	is	the	relationship	between	what	it	is	fitting	to	be	moti-
vated	to	do	and	what	there	is	reason	to	do,	which	we	state	as	a
Motivations-Actions Principle [MAP]: Let φ-ing be an ac-
tion. If R is a fittingness reason to be motivated to φ, then 
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It	is	important	to	clarify	that	neither	MAP	nor	this	explanation	of	









































we	 can	 assess	 them	 as	 reasonable	 or	 unreasonable	 by	 determining	
through	philosophical	reasoning	whether	they	are	fitting	or	unfitting.33 
Moreover,	as	we	have	seen,	it	is	characteristic	of	these	fittingness	as-








Thus,	 because	 reason	 governs	 motives	 other	 than	 intentions	
through	determinations	of	their	fittingness,	and	intentions	are	simply	
a	means	of	achieving	the	objects	of	these	motives,	fittingness	reasons	
for	 intention	 are	 identical	 to	fittingness	 reasons	 for	 these	other	mo-
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This	 view	 that	 all	 practical	 reasons	must	 be	 reasons	 to	 bring	 about	




tress	assessed from an impartial perspective.	That	is,	although	there	might	
seem	to	be	stronger	reasons	to	avoid	our	pain	and	help	our	children	
than	 to	alleviate	 the	pain	and	help	 the	children	of	others,	we	could	






TCR	 can	 thus	 accommodate	practical	 reasons	 to	do	 things	 other	
than	promote	the	impartial	good	by	holding	that	the	practical	reasons	
there	are	 for	an	agent	 to	act	must	be	 reasons	 to	promote	outcomes	






2.	 If	 there	are	fittingness	 reasons	 for	us	 to	have	a	pro-attitude	















them	about.	One	might	 think	 it	fitting	 to	desire	 the	 existence	of	 a	natural	
environment,	but	that	it	would	be	unfitting	to	desire	its	existence	if	it	were	
damaged	 and	 then	 restored,	 on	 account	 of	 its	 losing	 its	 naturalness.	 Even	
here,	there	would	be	cases	where	you	could	bring	about	the	environment’s	
existence	without	destroying	its	status	as	fittingly	desired	—	e.g.	by	prevent-
ing	others	 from	destroying	 it	 or	 just	 refraining	 from	destroying	 it	 yourself.	
Alternatively,	one	might	think	it	fitting	to	desire	some	state,	but	that	it	would	
be	wrong	to	try	to	bring	it	about,	and	consequently	that	it	would	be	unfitting	






































directed	motives	 and	 reasons	 to	 act	must	 be	 in	 terms	of	 fittingness	 rather	
than	pragmatic	reasons	for	motives	(else	the	pragmatic	reason	to	intrinsically	













































which	outcomes	we	have	most	 reason	 to	prefer	 and	which	 acts	we	








should	 act	 only	 in	 ways	 that	 adequately	 express	 one’s	 rational	 attitudes	
(which	 bears	 close	 similarities	 to	 our	 explanation	 of	 the	 relationship	 be-
tween	fitting	motives	and	reasons	to	act),	Portmore	(2011,	80)	correctly	ob-
serves	that	the	teleologist	can	point	to	desires	for	states	(like	that	of	one’s	
current	 actions	 adequately	 expressing	one’s	 rational	 attitudes)	 that	would	
motivate	the	same	acts	as	Anderson’s	theory.	Moreover,	it	is	plausible	that	




























ciating	 the	potential	painting	or	music.	 Since	aesthetic	 appreciation	
essentially	involves	intrinsic	motivation	to	engage	with	its	object	(for	
instance	by	 composing	or	performing	 it),	WCP	entails	 that	 this	 fact	
is	equally	a	fittingness	reason	to	be	intrinsically	motivated	to	engage	































do.	 But	 this	 same	 explanation	 also	 explains	why	 fitting	 state-direct-
ed	motives	 do	 not	—	although	 their	 fitting	 act-directed	 counterparts	
do	—	account	for	our	practical	reasons	in	other	cases.40








greater	 reasons	 to	prefer	oi	 to	oj,	because	some	cases	 (e. g.	 the	mutual	 fund	



































it	 provides	 a	more	unified	 account	 of	 the	 relationship	between	our	
reasons	for	preference	and	our	reasons	for	action.	













(FM)	one	has	more	fittingness	 reason	 to	be	motivated	 to	 per-
form	ai	than	to	perform	aj.













One	way	 to	 understand	decision	 theory	 is	 as	 a	 theory	 of	what	 it	 is	
reasonable	to	do	in	light	of	one’s	evidence,	assuming	 that	one’s	aims	






Apart	 from	common	 labelling	 conventions,	we	do	not	 think	 that	
there	 is	anything	 in	 the	 framework	of	 standard	decision	 theory	 that	
supports	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 decision	 maker’s	 ultimate	 aims,	
which	are	taken	as	given	or	assumed	to	be	reasonable,	must	be	state-


























O1),	 (S2, O2),	…,	 (Sn, On)},	which	associate	each	possible	 state	of	 the	
world	Si	with	an	outcome	Oi	that	will	obtain	if	the	act	is	performed	and	
Si	 obtains.	 If	 the	decision	maker’s	preferences	among	gambles	obey	









	 	 Still,	 if	Portmore’s	biconditional	did	 turn	out	 to	be	 true,	we	believe	our	
account	 would	 give,	 as	 he	 demands,	 a	 principled	 “explanation	 as	 to	 why	
sometimes	reasons	for	acting	are	explanatorily	prior	and	other	times	reasons	
for	desiring	are	explanatorily	prior”	(2011,	81).	Our	explanation	of	how	act-








tives	and	good	normative	 reasons	 to	 think	 that	 they	are	 sometimes	fitting.	
We	have	also	argued	that	the	very	principles	(WCP	and	MAP)	that	vindicate	
what	truth	there	 is	 in	TCR’s	order	of	explanation	entail	 that	 the	fittingness	
























46.	We	 take	 this	 to	 be	 a	 slightly	more	 detailed	 explanation	 of	why,	 as	Hurley	
(1997,	 123–124)	 claims,	 act-directed	 goals	 are	 consistent	 with	 a	 maximiz-
ing	conception	of	practical	 rationality.	One	could	 summarize	 the	plausible	
general	maximizing	principle	as	instructing	us	to	perform	the	acts	that	have	
the	greatest	expected	degree	of	support	by	reasons	(if	we	assume	our	aims	
are	 reasonable);	 or	 the	greatest	 expectation	of	 realizing	 the	objects	of	our	
intrinsic	motives,	weighted	by	 their	 strengths	 (if	 formulated	as	 a	principle	









thors	 like	 Portmore	 to	 be	 that,	 if	 sufficient	 relativization	 is	 allowed	 in	 the	
descriptions	of	states	of	affairs,	for	any	set	of	aims	that	includes	intrinsic	act-
directed	motives,	there	is	a	set	of	purely	state-directed	intrinsic	aims	that	will	










directed,	 these	 act-descriptions	will	 include	 only	 the	 outcomes	 that	
the	act	will	bring	about	 if	 the	state	obtains.	But	 in	cases	where	one	
has	intrinsic	act-directed	motives	that	might	(depending	on	the	state	
of	the	world)	favor	or	disfavor	the	act,	these	descriptions	will	include	
properties	of	the	act	(like	is a keeping of a promise, is a killing of an inno-
cent)	other	than	the	outcomes	it	brings	about.	We	can	thus	understand	























or	 to	 the	sorts	of	explanations	of	actions	and	act-directed	motives	 that	are	
produced	by	the	motives	combining	with	flat-out	beliefs.















We	 think	 that	 the	only	 thing	 that	unifies	 the	content	of	all	 these	



















	 	 One	 might	 worry	 that	 feeling	 obligated	 not	 to	 do	 something	 involves	
judging	that	it	would	be	wrong	to	do	it,	in	which	case	it	would	be	circular	to	
in	the	same	way	as	reasons	to	promote	good	outcomes	should	demys-






































Fitting Attitude Analysis of Moral Reasons:	 To	 judge	
that	R	is	a	moral	reason	for	agent	X	to	φ	is	to	judge	that	
R	is	a	fittingness	reason	for	X	to	feel	obligated	to	φ,	and	

















and	a	dispositional	 sense.	Occurrent	 feelings	 and	preferences	 exert	 causal	
pressure	on	one’s	behavior	 at	 the	moment,	 and	 (at	 least	 typically)	 involve	
phenomenal	experiences,	while	dispositional	feelings	and	preferences	mere-
ly	have	the	disposition	to	become	occurrent	in	certain	circumstances.	Thus	
















that	 states	 are	 good	 as	 judgments	 about	 the	 fittingness	 of	 pro-atti-
tudes	 towards	 them,	we	 think	 that	 the	content	and	normative	 force	
of	 judgments	 that	 acts	 are	wrong	or	 opposed	by	moral	 reasons	 are	
best	captured	by	analyzing	them	as	judgments	about	the	fittingness	
of	 feeling	obligated	not	 to	 perform	 them.	 For	 instance,	what	 seems	
distinctive	about	viewing	the	fact	that	doing A will	save	someone’s	life	








































for	 the	 link	 between	morality	 and	 practical	 reasons	 to	 be	mediated	




















































of	good	states,	we	will	not	 rely	on	 this	strong	claim	that	 judgments	










then	proposed	 that	we	analyze	 judgments	 that	X’s	ψ-ing	 is	morally	wrong	
as	 judgments	 that	X’s	ψ-ing	would	be	morally	blameworthy	absent	excuse.	
While	we	agree	 that	 there	 is	a	 conceptual	 connection	between	wrongness	
and	blameworthiness,	Gibbard’s	1990	analysis	offers	no	way	of	interpreting	
conflicting	 normative	 judgments	 about	 excuses,	 and	 does	 not	 explain	 the	
role	 of	 normative	 judgments	 in	 guiding	 prospective	 behavior.	We	 believe	
that	adopting	the	analysis	of	moral	wrongness	defended	by	Nye	(2009)	to-
gether	with	Gibbard’s	analysis	of	moral	blameworthiness	can	overcome	these	
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is	not	in	pain.	Absent	special	obligations	to	either	Leslie	or	Gertrude,	
there	is	no	stronger	reason	to	feel	obligated	to	bring it about that	Les-
lie	 is	not	 in	pain	than	to	bring it about	 that	Gertrude	is	not	 in	pain.53 
But	it	is	plausible	that	the	fact	that	your	act	will	cause	Leslie	pain	is	a	
stronger	reason	to	feel	obligated	not to perform it	than	your	reasons	to	
feel	obligated	to	bring	it	about	that	Gertrude	is	not	in	pain.	If	the	only	

















damentally act-directed,	 in	 that	 they	ultimately	derive	 from	the	fitting-
ness	of	attitudes	towards	acts,	even	though	they	are	intrinsic	reasons	
to	bring	about	states	simply	because	of	what	those	states	involve.54






































an	act	directly	entails	 that	 it	 is	a	fittingness	 reason	 to	 feel	obligated	
not	to	do	it,	which	entails	that	it	is	a	practical	reason	against	doing	it.	
There	 is	 no	 reason	 in	 the	 abstract	why	 these	 reasons	 cannot	 be	 en-
tirely	act-directed:	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	the	fact	that	your	act	will	
cause	Leslie	pain	is	a	reason	to	feel	obligated	not to perform that act,	as	
opposed	to	simply	a	reason	to	feel	obligated	to	bring	it	about	that	she	










for	 preferring	 relativized	 versions	 of	 consequentialism	 like	 Port-
more’s	 to	 non-consequentialism,	 as	 this	 case	 relies	 almost	 exclu-
sively	on	the	teleological	conception	of	practical	reasons.	Moreover,	
we	think	our	explanation	of	how	morality	could	give	us	entirely	act- 
directed	 practical	 reasons	 helps	 us	 understand	 the	 strength	 of	 the	

















against	 the	 initial	plausibility	of	non-consequentialist	 ideas,	so	even	
















We	 have	 thus	 argued	 that,	 because	 there	 is	 no	mystery	 about	 how	
there	could	be	reasons	to	do	things	other	than	promote	the	good	that	
are	both	practical	and	moral,	the	top-down	strategy	of	arguing	for	con-
sequentialism	 fails.	 The	 deep	 theoretical	 connection	 between	 good	


























argued	 that	non-moral	 considerations	 are	genuine	practical	 reasons	


















































Non-redundant	 forms	 of	 contractualism	 take	 a	 similar	 design	
stance	towards	morality	by	holding	that	moral	principles	are	justified	
55.	 These	 non-consequentialist	 ideas	 are	 exactly	 the	 ones	 relativized	 conse-
quentialists	 seek	 to	 preserve	 by	 “consequentializing”	 them,	 so	 their	 being	
undermined	 would	 support	 impartial	 consequentialism	 over	 both	 non-
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